5.3 Southwest Asia and North Africa: Lines on the Map, Wealth Beneath the Ground
Southwest Asia and North AfricaLines on the Map, Wealth Beneath the Ground
What is the relationship among colonialism, oil, borders, and development in Southwest Asia and North Africa?
Current-events review: August 18, 2026By the end of this section, you should be able to
- Distinguish formal colonial rule from informal imperial influence.
- Explain how borders, infrastructure, and political categories can preserve imperial geography after independence.
- Compare Israeli and Palestinian national histories while recognizing unequal control over territory and movement.
- Explain how petroleum can expand public capacity while also encouraging rentier politics, economic dependence, and unequal development.
- Use the Strait of Hormuz to show how a small geographic chokepoint can acquire worldwide importance.
Before the Conquest Came the Picture
Empire often arrived carrying a rifle. But it also carried a paintbrush, a surveyor's chain, a contract, and a remarkably confident map.
The nineteenth-century British artist John Frederick Lewis lived in Cairo and painted elaborate interiors populated by richly dressed figures. His pictures were technically brilliant and enormously influential. They also helped European audiences imagine Southwest Asia and North Africa as sensual, mysterious, timeless, and fundamentally different from modern Europe.
The Palestinian American scholar Edward Said called this system of representation Orientalism. In his 1978 book of that name, Said argued that Europeans did more than study a place they called "the Orient." They constructed an idea of it: exotic but backward, beautiful but irrational, ancient but incapable of governing itself. Europe could then imagine itself as the opposite: modern, rational, disciplined, and naturally qualified to rule.
Said was not claiming that every European description was false or that outsiders could never understand another society. His more unsettling question was this: Who possesses the authority to describe whom?
Who names a region? Who draws its borders? Who selects the images appearing in museums and textbooks? Who gets described as modern, and who becomes "traditional"? Who appears as an individual, and who becomes merely an example of a culture?
Even the names Middle East and Near East place Europe at the center of the map. Middle of what? Near to whom? Southwest Asia and North Africa is not a perfect label, because no regional label is. At least it describes location without making London or Paris the starting point of the universe.
Representation and political power often traveled together. Once a society had been described as disorganized, stagnant, fanatical, or incapable of managing its own resources, outside control could be presented not as conquest but as assistance.
Empire had excellent public relations.
Empire With a Ruler and a Red Pencil
Before European conquest, much of Southwest Asia and North Africa belonged to the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman rule was itself imperial, and local communities did not experience it uniformly. The empire governed Arabs, Turks, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, Christians, Muslims, and many others through changing combinations of taxation, negotiation, local autonomy, and military force.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European powers gradually weakened or replaced Ottoman authority. France invaded Algeria in 1830, established control over Tunisia in 1881, and made Morocco a protectorate in 1912. Britain occupied Egypt in 1882, partly because of Egypt's debts and the strategic importance of the Suez Canal. Italy invaded Libya in 1911.
After the Ottoman Empire collapsed following World War I, Britain and France divided much of its Arab territory into League of Nations mandates. France controlled Syria and Lebanon. Britain governed Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan and exercised varying degrees of influence over smaller states of the Persian Gulf.
A mandate sounded more respectable than a colony. The arrangement remained familiar: European officials governed another people while promising that the arrangement was temporary and educational. The empire had changed the label on the folder.
Colonial borders were not all random, and they were not simply straight lines drawn by absent-minded officials. But many reflected imperial priorities: ports, railway routes, oil concessions, military corridors, administrative convenience, and rivalry with other powers. Some boundaries divided communities accustomed to moving across the landscape. Others placed different peoples inside a single state and expected a national identity to appear on schedule.
Colonial infrastructure followed a similar logic. Roads and railways frequently connected mines, plantations, or oil fields to ports. They moved resources outward and troops inward. Connections among neighboring communities often received less attention. Independence changed who controlled the government, but it did not instantly redesign the transportation network.
Algeria became the region's clearest case of European settler colonialism. French settlers seized land and attempted to make Algeria an extension of France. Algerian resistance eventually produced a brutal war of independence from 1954 to 1962. More than a century of French rule ended, but land loss, migration, cultural conflict, and memories of violence did not disappear with the lowering of a flag.
Egypt's struggle over the Suez Canal exposed the changing shape of empire. When President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the canal in 1956, Britain, France, and Israel invaded. Pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union forced them to withdraw. The old European empires could no longer act quite as they once had. Outside intervention had not ended. It had acquired new sponsors and new techniques.
Iran: Never Quite Colonized, Never Left Alone
Iran complicates any tidy map of colonialism. It was never formally colonized like Algeria, yet foreign powers repeatedly restricted its choices. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Russia and Britain competed for influence over Iranian territory, trade, and government. In 1907, they divided much of Iran into spheres of influence. British interests also gained extensive control over petroleum through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, later renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.
In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh nationalized Iran's oil industry. He argued that a sovereign country should control the resource beneath its own soil, a position that sounds considerably less radical when phrased that way. Britain responded with economic pressure. In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence helped organize the coup that removed Mossadegh and strengthened Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Declassified American documents make the U.S. role unmistakable.
The shah promoted industrialization, education, land reform, and closer relations with the West. He also concentrated power, restricted opposition, and relied on the feared SAVAK security service. For many Americans, the shah appeared to be a modernizing ally. For many Iranians, he represented an authoritarian government protected by the same foreign powers that had helped overturn Mossadegh.
That history helps explain the intensity of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The revolution overthrew the shah, established the Islamic Republic, and turned the United States from Iran's principal supporter into its principal enemy. Yet Iran should never be confused with the Iranian government. The Green Movement in 2009 and the Woman, Life, Freedom movement beginning in 2022 revealed deep struggles over elections, gender, religion, economic life, and state power. A country of roughly ninety million people does not have one mind.
Iran's nuclear program, missile capabilities, and support for armed groups across the region have placed it at the center of confrontation. Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear and military sites in June 2025 were followed by U.S. strikes on facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan. Fighting escalated again in 2026. The International Atomic Energy Agency stopped all in-field verification in Iran in February 2026 because of the military conflict; it resumed a routine inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in early June, while access to other declared facilities remained severely restricted.
Iran therefore illustrates several forms of power at once: informal empire, covert intervention, revolutionary resistance, authoritarian government, popular protest, sanctions, military deterrence, and control over strategic geography.
Israel and Palestine: Two National Histories on the Same Land
Few conflicts demonstrate Said's argument about language and power more clearly than Israel and Palestine. The people involved tell different histories, but those histories occupy the same landscape.
Jewish connections to this land are ancient. Modern Zionism emerged in nineteenth-century Europe amid antisemitism, pogroms, exclusion, and eventually the Holocaust. To many Jews, Zionism represented national self-determination and the desperate need for refuge.
Palestinians, however, were not scenery awaiting the arrival of somebody else's history. They were an Arabic-speaking society of farmers, merchants, laborers, landowners, Christians, Muslims, villagers, and urban residents. Their towns, orchards, religious sites, cemeteries, and family memories were already embedded in the landscape.
Britain's 1917 Balfour Declaration supported a "national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine while Britain was taking control of the territory. It also stated that the rights of existing non-Jewish communities should not be harmed. Reconciling those promises proved impossible, especially as immigration increased and both Jewish and Palestinian Arab nationalism grew.
In 1947, the United Nations proposed partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Jewish leaders accepted the plan as the basis for statehood. Arab leaders rejected a division they considered unjust. Israel declared independence in 1948, neighboring Arab armies entered the war, and Israel survived while expanding beyond the boundaries proposed by the United Nations.
For Israelis, 1948 became independence. For Palestinians, it became the Nakba, or catastrophe: mass displacement, the destruction or depopulation of hundreds of communities, and the creation of a refugee population that now spans generations.
In the 1967 war, Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula, and Golan Heights. Egypt later regained Sinai through a peace agreement, but Israel retained control over the other territories in different forms. Israeli settlements spread through the West Bank and East Jerusalem, producing a fragmented landscape of Palestinian towns, settlement blocs, restricted roads, military zones, barriers, and checkpoints.
The 1990s Oslo Accords created the Palestinian Authority and divided the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C. The arrangement was presented as a stage on the road toward Palestinian statehood. Instead, the supposedly temporary geography became remarkably durable. Palestinian authorities gained limited control over disconnected areas while Israel retained decisive authority over borders, security, movement, settlements, and most land in Area C.
Israel removed permanent settlements and ground forces from inside Gaza in 2005. Hamas took control in 2007. Israel and Egypt imposed severe restrictions on movement across Gaza's borders, while Israel controlled most access to Gaza's airspace, coastline, trade, and population registry. Hamas governed internally and periodically fought wars with Israel.
The Hamas-led attack of October 7, 2023, killed Israeli civilians and soldiers and took hostages into Gaza. Israel's subsequent war devastated Gaza's cities and infrastructure, killed large numbers of Palestinians, and displaced most of the territory's population. By August 14, 2026, United Nations reporting still described most Gazans as internally displaced and facing severe humanitarian conditions; an early-July assessment found moderate-to-high water insecurity affecting about 90 percent of the population.
In the West Bank, territorial control continued to be built into everyday movement. OCHA's August 14 report recorded 38 settler attacks in a single reporting week, alongside demolitions, displacement, injuries, and disruptions around Qalandiya. The broader pattern of settlement expansion, barriers, military zones, permit rules, and movement obstacles continued to fragment land Palestinians seek for a future state.
Many Palestinians and some historians describe Zionist settlement and the continuing occupation as settler colonialism: an incoming population establishes sovereignty while displacing, confining, or subordinating an existing population. Many Israelis reject that framework, arguing that Jews are indigenous to the land, that Zionism was a movement of national return and refuge, and that Israel's wars arose from repeated threats to its survival.
Students should understand both arguments without pretending that the present distribution of power is equal. Israel is a sovereign state with a powerful military and extensive control over borders and movement. Palestinians remain divided among occupied, displaced, refugee, exiled, and politically fragmented populations.
In a 2024 advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel's continued presence in the occupied Palestinian territory was unlawful and that its settlement policy violated international law. Israel rejected the court's reasoning, but the opinion placed the legal geography of occupation squarely before the international community.
The words used to describe this conflict are never innocent. A person may be called a settler, resident, colonist, pioneer, refugee, militant, terrorist, soldier, or freedom fighter. These terms are not interchangeable, and none can substitute for evidence. But vocabulary influences whose movement appears natural, whose suffering becomes visible, and whose claim to the landscape is treated as legitimate.
Oil Changes the Bargain
Oil did not create imperial interest in the region, but it gave that interest a powerful new engine.
Early petroleum development often operated through concessions granted to British, American, French, and other foreign corporations. Companies gained access to large territories and controlled production, refining, transportation, and pricing. Local governments received royalties, but foreign firms initially retained much of the expertise, decision-making power, and profit.
Governments eventually renegotiated contracts, nationalized resources, and created state-owned petroleum companies. In 1960, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela founded the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, in Baghdad.
Petroleum revenue funded roads, schools, hospitals, ports, airports, electrical systems, public employment, subsidies, and ambitious cities. It also created sovereign wealth funds whose investments stretch around the planet. Oil wealth is real. So are its contradictions.
Political scientists use rentier state for a government receiving much of its income from external rents, such as oil exports, rather than from taxes paid by citizens. Taxation can create pressure for public accountability. A petroleum state can reverse the relationship: the government distributes salaries, housing, subsidies, and contracts without depending as heavily on citizens for revenue.
The slogan "no taxation without representation" gains an odd mirror image. Limited taxation can sometimes accompany limited representation.
This does not mean petroleum automatically produces dictatorship. Oil acts less like a political destiny than an amplifier. It can finance public capacity and social development. It can also provide rulers with money for patronage, surveillance, security forces, and protection from public pressure. Institutions, class relations, colonial histories, warfare, and foreign alliances shape what resource wealth does.
Oil can also distort an economy through Dutch disease. Large export earnings may strengthen a currency and pull investment, workers, and political attention toward energy. Manufactured goods and agricultural products become easier to import than to produce domestically. A country may become fabulously wealthy while its economy becomes less diverse.
The labor geography examined in Section 2 belongs to this same system. Capital, petroleum, and workers cross borders more easily than citizenship does. The polished airport and the restrictive visa are not contradictions. They are parts of the same political economy.
Hormuz: Geography's Narrow Hallway
The Strait of Hormuz is a classic geographic chokepoint: a narrow passage through which a disproportionate amount of global movement must pass. It connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the wider Indian Ocean. Iran lies along its northern shore, and Oman occupies the southern side.
In 2024, oil flow through Hormuz averaged about 20 million barrels per day. In the last quarter of 2025, immediately before the 2026 conflict, the U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that petroleum liquids moving through the strait averaged 21.6 million barrels per day.
A chokepoint is geography turned into leverage. It is a narrow hallway in which the world economy suddenly becomes claustrophobic.
The conflict that began on February 28, 2026 sharply reduced traffic and oil shipments. EIA estimates that petroleum liquids moving through Hormuz averaged only 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter of 2026, less than one-quarter of the pre-conflict Q4 2025 level.
By August 18, the political description of the strait and the shipping reality had diverged. The United States said the waterway was open, while Iran said it would remain shut until the United States met conditions tied to the failed interim agreement. Commercial traffic remained severely depressed: preliminary ship-tracking data counted six commodity vessels crossing on August 17, with no very large crude carriers or LNG tankers recorded. Some untracked traffic may have moved with transponders switched off.
This is why control does not require sealing a route with a literal wall. The ability to interrupt it, threaten it, or make insurers and shipowners fear interruption can affect fuel prices, shipping schedules, government budgets, and household expenses thousands of miles away.
After Oil, or Alongside It?
Governments across the region are investing in solar power, hydrogen, aviation, tourism, finance, logistics, data centers, and new urban projects. North Africa has strong solar and wind potential and sits close to European markets. Gulf sovereign wealth funds are buying stakes in industries far beyond petroleum.
Diversification is still difficult when oil and gas revenues finance the projects meant to reduce dependence on oil and gas. A government can diversify its investment portfolio without diversifying employment, decision-making, or political power.
The future will not be a clean switch from "oil region" to "green region." It will be a contested layering of inherited infrastructure and new ambition. Noor Ouarzazate, Morocco's enormous solar complex, offers a fitting image. Mirrors gather sunlight in the desert, but the project still depends on land, water, transmission lines, finance, and state decisions. New energy changes the technology. It does not abolish geography.
The Map Is Not the Territory, but It Can Become a Weapon
Formal European empires largely disappeared from Southwest Asia and North Africa during the twentieth century. Their effects did not. Borders, extraction-oriented transport systems, disputes over land, military bases, arms sales, sanctions, covert operations, security alliances, and unequal control over movement remain.
Colonialism cannot explain everything that happened after independence. Regional leaders possess agency and responsibility. Citizens organize, resist, negotiate, migrate, invent, and sometimes support policies outsiders find difficult to understand. Treating every local action as nothing more than a consequence of Western empire would repeat the habit Said criticized: turning millions of people into passive objects in somebody else's story.
The larger lesson is not to replace one simple narrative with another. It is to become suspicious of simple narratives, especially when powerful people can make their version appear on the map.

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